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Abstract
Threats to network security increase with growing volumes and velocity of data across networks, and they present
challenges not only to law enforcement agencies, but to businesses, families and individuals. The volume, velocity
and veracity of shared data across networks entail accurate and reliable automated tools for filtering out useful from
malicious, noisy or irrelevant data. While data mining and machine learning techniques have widely been adopted
within the network security community, challenges and gaps in knowledge extraction from data have remained due to
insufficient data sources on attacks on which to test the algorithms accuracy and reliability. We propose a data-flow
adaptive approach to intrusion detection based on high-dimensional cyber-attacks data. The algorithm repeatedly
takes random samples from an inherently bi-modal, high-dimensional dataset of 82332 observations on 25 numeric
and two categorical variables. Its main idea is to capture subtle information resulting from reduced data dimension of
a large number of malicious flows and by iteratively estimating roles played by individual variables in construction
of key components. Data visualisation and numerical results provide a clear separation of a set of variables associated
with attack types and show that component-dominating parameters are crucial in monitoring future attacks.
Key Words: Cross-Validation, Cyber-Security, Data Mining, Dimensional Reduction, Intrusion Detection, Principal
Component Analysis
1 Introduction
Anomaly intrusion detection deals with detection of unknown malicious traffic across networks which can be difficult
to identify without planned intervention. Network administrators struggle to keep up with Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) alerts, and often manually examine system logs to discover potential attacks. In recent years, data mining
and machine learning techniques have widely been adopted within the network security community [1, 2] mainly
due to the need for a greater understanding of the underlying intrusion detection rules in the Big Data Era [3]. These
developments have brought about both opportunities and challenges, requiring novel approaches to security design and
modelling [4, 5]. While various tools, methods and techniques have been developed to deal with intrusion detection
and ensure network security, gaps remain, apparently due to insufficient data sources on attacks on which to train and
test intrusion detection algorithms. We propose a data-flow adaptive approach to intrusion detection based on high-
dimensional cyber-attacks data described in Section 3.1. Our approach derives from the original ideas in [6, 7] and [8]
who laid down the general framework for domain-partitioning rule-based intrusion detection. In particular, [6] applied
association rules and frequent episodes from audit data for feature selection processes while [7] combined association
mining with classification. Both were driven by ”the degree of confidence” associated with intrusion detection–a
parameter that heavily relies on samples, hence a key challenge in knowledge extraction from data. This paper seeks
to uncover the general intrusion behaviour via multiple sampling. In particular, the paper focuses on dimensional
reduction as discussed in [9, 10, 11] and its main objectives are defined as follows.
1. To uncover natural groupings in data traffic through multiple sampling and validation
2. To comparatively assess the emerging naturally arising groupings and
3. To propose a data-adaptive framework for future network intrusion detection
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines previous work relating to the overall behaviour of intrusion
and normal activities. It is followed, in Section 3, by the methods outlining the data sources and the adopted methods.
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2. BACKGROUND
Data analyses, results and discussions are in Section 4 and concluding remarks and recommendations in Section 5.
2 Background
Data sampling, randomness, multicollinearity, missing data and outliers are some of the main issues which data an-
alysts have to deal with in their quest to attain modelling accuracy and reliability. Many have been widely studied
and documented–see, for instance, [12, 13] & [14]. The need for flexible and adaptive security oriented approaches to
intrusion detection has triggered a growing interest in computational intelligence methods–artificial neural networks,
fuzzy systems, evolutionary computation, artificial immune systems, swarm intelligence and soft computing [1]. Iden-
tifying the most relevant features in intrusion detection is not confined to algorithmic computing as it depends much
on existing expert domain knowledge skills and the way they are combined with automated tools.
Combining existing domain knowledge and automated learning techniques to solve the intrusion detection problems is
generally attributed to the overall objective of data mining, i.e., knowledge extraction from data. Typically, frameworks
for attaining that objective are based on pre-defined ontologies with inherently highly dynamic parameters. The dy-
namics of these parameters are encapsulated within the domains of unsupervised and supervised modelling for which
many applications have been developed in recent years [2]. This paper builds upon some of the recent developments
and it seeks to develop an integrated strategy to harmonising inherent dynamics in modelling cyber-attacks.
3 Methods
Adopted methods fulfil the following key functions–data understanding, cleansing, clustering and interpretation. More
specifically, the paper explores a high-dimensional dataset for systematic characteristics of cyber-attacks. However,
capturing and managing the dynamics of cyber-attacks constitute a fundamental challenge, not least because of inher-
ent randomness in data, against the backdrop of which the study motivation and objectives are described.
3.1 Data Sources
Potentially highly correlated data variables were generated from thousands of raw network packets of the UNSW-NB
15 created by the IXIA PerfectStorm tool in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS).
The dataset, created using twelve algorithms [15, 16], represents a high-dimensional data which we denote by
Ω = xi,j [τ ] i = 1, 2, 3 . . . n; j = 1, 2, 3, . . . p; 2 ≤ τ ≤ n (1)
where n = 82, 332 is the number of observations, p = 27 is the number of variables and τ is the sample size randomly
selected from Ω,with replacement. The dataset, the attributes of which and summary are shown in Figure 1, represents
37,000 normal flows–almost 45% of the total flow, and nine different types of malicous flows. Some of the variables
on the left hand side (LHS) panel derive from others–e.g., tcprtt is the sum of synack and ackdat and label is a
binarized version of attacka. Apparently, the multivariate data present an ideal case of multicollinearity.
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Table 1: Data attributes and class labels (LHS) and summary of the UNSW-NB 15 data flow types (RHS)
The right hand side (RHS) panel exhibits nine malicious categories and one normal. The former takes two forms–binomial
and multinomial–forming a good data source for multiple sampling, training and testing. To fulfil the foregoing ob-
jectives, sampled subsets xi[τ ] where τ is an indicator of sample sizes are extracted for natural grouping.
3.2 Modelling Strategy
The samples are used to form natural groupings Ciτ each with a notional probability pik[τ ] such that
∑K
k=1 pik[τ ],
where k = 1, 2, . . . K is the number of groups and the p−dimensional probability function p (xτ,j , ωk) is fully
described by the distributional parameters ωk. Throughout the samples, one parameter of interest is
ξτ =
∑n
i=1 zˆi,k[τ ]∑n
i=1 zˆi,k[τ ] +
∑n
i=1 zˆi,k¯[τ ]
∝
K∑
k=1
pik (2)
where zˆi,k[τ ] is an indicator variable denoting membership to group k or otherwise and τ = 1, 2, 3 . . .m is the sample
number. Now, consider a case from a completely random traffic in which na =
∑n
i=1 zˆi,k[τ ] is the total number of
cases identified as malicious and n − na =
∑n
i=1 (1− zˆi,k[τ ]) . Given random sampling, a natural estimator for the
average normal flow effect can be presented as the difference in the average outcomes of the cases identified as normal
versus identified as malicious. The parameter of interest in Equation 2 leads to the expression in Equation 3.
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
zˆi,k[τ ]xi,k[τ ]
na
n
− (1− zˆi,k) [τ ]xi,k[τ ]n−na
n
]
∝ ξτ (3)
Since every sample is fixed, randomness only manifests in the component zˆi,k[τ ] and subsequently in ξτ ∝ pik. Thus,
the main idea of our strategy is that, by treating membership to these group proportions as missing data and repeatedly
sampling and validating clusters, we characterise the overall behaviour of cyber-intrusion. That is, given xτ as defined
above, we can separate k groups with probabilities pik and pik¯ corresponding to different descriptions of intrusion.
Correlation analysis, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) are well-known
conventional methods that can be applied to analyse the variations in Equation 3. In particular, the KDE, defined as
fˆβ (xiτ ) =
1
β
n∑
i=1
Kβ (zˆiτx− xiτ ) = 1
nβ
K
(
zˆiτx− xiτ
β
)
(4)
where
∫
Kβ (zˆiτx− xiτ ) = 1 is zero-centred and the key parameter β > 0 determines the number of emerging
structures in the sample and therefore its optimal value is proportional to the variations between zˆi,k and 1 − zˆi,k.
Likewise, we can reduce the data dimension by generating uncorrelated new variables via PCA whereby each derived
components are linear combinations of the original variables and ordered in accordance with variation they account
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for. For the nτ × p matrix from each sample, we can compute matrix V which diagonalises the covariance matrix Σ
such that V−1ΣV = G, where G is a matrix of the eigenvalues of Σ. The columns of V are orthorgonal to each
other and they define the principal components whereas the diagonal values of G are the variances of the components.
The orthogonal V are the eigenvectors, i.e., uncorrelated data with directions and magnitude defining each component.
As far as optimising variation in data is concerned, β and eigenvalues play a similar role and so, in both cases, we can
optimise their expected values via repeated sampling. For example, through each sample we can generate a correlation
matrix that is re-ordered based on the angular order of the eigenvectors as defined in Equation 5.
ρi,τ =
tan
(
ei,2
ei,1
)
, if ei,1 > 0
tan
(
ei,2
ei,1
)
+ pi, if ei,1 < 0
(5)
where e1 and e2 are the largest eigenvalues from the matrix. The mechanics for implementing the foregoing strategy
in pursuit of the objectives outlined in Section 1 are presented in a finite number of steps in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
1: procedure OPTIMAL VARIATION(OPTIVA)
2: Load xi,j ⊂ Ω.
3: Set: S[τ ] = s1, s2, . . . sm (Sample sizes vector of length m) .
4: Init: Φρ (.) = Ø (Correlation Storage Matrix) .
5: Init: L (.) = Ø (Loadings/Directions Storage Matrix) .
6: Init: ∆L (.) = Ø (Sample-based Variations in Loadings/Directions) .
7: while µ ≤ m do
8: Update µ := µ+ 1.
9: Sτ ← zˆi,jxi,j [τ ] ⊂ Ω.
10: Update Φτ (.)← ρi,τ ← Sτ .
11: Update Lτ (.) ←
{
vj,τ ; gj,τ ;
dj,τ∑n
i=1 di,τ
}
← Ci,j [τ ].
12: Update ∆L (.) ← +− {Lµ − Lµ+1} .
13: for η = 1→ dimLi,j do
14: CA∆,τ =
∑µ
ι=1 ∆L(.)
µ ⇐⇒ ∆Lµ+1(.)+µCA∆,µµ+1 = CA∆,µ+1 (Cummulative Moving Average) .
15: Plot CA∆,µ+1[j, τ ] (For Validation) .
16: Store CA∆,µ+1[j, τ ].
17: Store Lµ (Dom) ← CA∆,µ+1[j, τ ] (Dominant Loadings) .
18: end for
19: end while
20: Output and interpret Cm,i,j [τ ].
21: end procedure
The algorithm repeatedly takes up to m samples of different sizes, spacing and order from Ω. The magnitudes can
be determined via exploratory analyses but the order is not particularly important. The algorithm’s main idea is to
compare variations in rotations - the quantities which form the principal components. Averaging of the variations may
be confined to a few components contributing to the highest variation in data or may include all j = p components.
4 Results and Discussions
In this section we present key results from implementing Algorithm 1 on data repeatedly sampled from Ω, as defined
in Equation 1 and described in Table 1. As noted above, some of its key inputs such as sample sizes and spacing can be
determined via exploratory analysis for insights into variable correlations, emerging natural structures and validation.
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4.1 Preliminary Analyses
The two panels in Figure 1 exhibit correlation structures among the transmission variables. They both provide insights
into how different transmission parameters interact based on which we can adjust the sampling parameters mentioned
above. The RHS panel provides an ordered visual pattern that can be useful further analyses as in PCA below. Figure 1
Figure 1: Full data correlogram (LHS) and one for sample size 50 (RHS)
exhibits two extreme cases of the variable correlations based on the number of observations. In both cases it is evident
that the variables dpkts, dloss and dbytes are highly correlated–almost perfectly positive. The same can be said of
synack and tcprtt; tcprtt and ackdat as well as spkts, sloss, sbytes. While there aren’t many extreme cases of high
correlation in the full dataset, samples drawn from it indicate high multicollinearity among the variables. Interpretation
of principal components, discussed below, is preceded by computations of correlations between the original data for
each variable and each extracted component. It is worth noting that interpretation of the principal components is based
on finding the variables which most correlate with the components, as discussed below.
4.2 Extracting, Interpreting and Optimising Principal Components
The panels in Figure 2 represent the same plot of the first two components from the full data labelled by all type of data
flows on the left and by the binarised flow on the right. By the eigenvalue rule we can accept 8 components which
have a value greater than 1. The first eight components account for 81.34% of variation in the original data with the
first through eighth accounting for 24.3%, 14.4%, 11.55%, 8.97%, 8.48%, 5.15%, 4.28% and 4.19% respectively. We
see, on the left hand side panel, that there is a clear separation of attributes that describe Exploits, Dos and Generic
attack types–exhibited on the right as malicious and normal flows. That is, the first component strongly correlates
with these variables as well as with normal flow–increasing with malicious and decreasing with normal flows. This
suggests that the three attack types vary together–i.e., as one goes up the other two tend to do the same. We can use
the numerics associated with this component to measure and monitor the risk of these type of attacks.
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Figure 2: Two panels of the same plot with multi-class and binary labelling
Loadings of the first eight components from the full data are presented in Table 2, where it can be seen that there is
no single very high correlation between the variables and the extracted components. The magnitudes and directions
of the loadings underline the existing multicollinearity among the data flow variables which can also be explained
by the large number of components extracted. These metrics represent the influence of the individual variables in
constructing the component and, hence, by repeatedly sampling and extracting new components we generate a range
of new metrics which can be aggregared and averaged in line with Algorithm 1.
Figure 3: Selected runs for first component patterns generated by the full data and different sample sizes
Particularly interesting are the variables which contribute to the highest variation in the data–these are the ones which
are most highly correlate with extracted components. The two panels in Figure 3 show patterns generated by the full
data and four different sample sizes. In both cases, the full dataset exhibits a predominantly positive contribution by
most variables in forming the cluster but samples, large and small, exhibit both positive and negative relationships
between the variables and the component exhibiting, in both cases, a clear binary pattern.
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LOADINGS FOR THE FIRST EIGHT COMPONENTS - FULL DATA
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
dur 0.214 0.127 0.020 -0.112 0.210 -0.374 0.196 0.026
spkts 0.194 -0.275 0.094 -0.041 0.333 -0.138 0.335 -0.436
dpkts 0.219 -0.181 -0.045 0.104 -0.206 -0.100 0.070 -0.035
sbytes 0.174 -0.288 0.248 -0.355 0.120 -0.064 0.163 -0.236
dbytes 0.216 -0.200 -0.065 0.123 -0.219 -0.105 0.073 -0.028
rate -0.191 -0.195 0.290 0.267 -0.034 0.142 -0.083 -0.142
sttl -0.042 0.196 0.628 0.297 0.074 -0.438 0.118 0.290
dttl 0.221 -0.033 -0.018 0.088 -0.341 -0.081 0.091 0.111
sload -0.177 -0.199 0.410 0.168 -0.053 0.100 -0.080 -0.050
dload 0.200 -0.257 -0.102 0.151 -0.350 -0.105 0.134 0.116
sloss 0.218 -0.087 0.071 0.046 0.239 0.225 0.073 0.219
dloss 0.218 -0.149 0.032 0.115 0.170 0.226 0.011 -0.123
sinpkt 0.204 0.192 -0.176 -0.203 0.183 -0.147 -0.051 0.143
dinpkt 0.219 0.062 0.037 0.057 -0.047 -0.222 -0.527 -0.155
sjit 0.221 0.110 0.009 -0.055 0.141 -0.158 -0.036 0.262
djit 0.216 -0.021 0.024 0.102 0.092 -0.210 -0.593 -0.283
swin 0.219 -0.025 0.049 0.100 0.207 0.240 0.001 0.379
stcpb 0.225 -0.041 0.058 0.094 0.092 0.236 -0.100 0.089
dtcpb 0.225 -0.041 0.058 0.094 0.091 0.235 -0.100 0.087
dwin 0.226 -0.041 0.058 0.094 0.092 0.233 -0.100 0.084
tcprtt 0.190 0.366 0.144 0.000 -0.168 0.176 0.109 -0.209
synack 0.186 0.373 0.143 -0.004 -0.172 0.184 0.138 -0.206
ackdat 0.183 0.390 0.148 -0.008 -0.186 0.159 0.107 -0.239
smean 0.054 -0.168 0.380 -0.700 -0.292 0.090 -0.204 0.213
dmean 0.214 -0.166 -0.077 0.124 -0.310 -0.115 0.081 0.085
Table 2: Loadings of the first eight components accounting for 81.34% of the variation in the original data
We can take a closer look at the structure of the components–particularly how its numerics can be used to measure and
monitor attack risks. The prcomp in R returns a matrix of loadings, the columns of which contain the eigenvectors.
Since each sample yields a different set of these values which occur in a subspace of the retained components and, as
such, they are affected by the choice of the subspace. It is therefore reasonable to consider their descriptive statistics
over different sample space sizes in order to attain robust interpretation of their role in forming the components. Key
descriptive statistics taken from across 40 random samples for each of the 25 malicious flows are presented in Table 3
with a graphical illustration in Figure 4. Note that most of the variables average above zero and only a handful–rate,
stll, sload and sinpkt take a below zero average which is in line with the upward trend in PC1 in Figure 2.
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Variable Mean STD Minimum Maximum Median
dur 0.053241072 0.049069703 -0.089779978 0.096179555 0.070608542
spkts 0.079086356 0.073230517 -0.131049938 0.190921677 0.099165296
dpkts 0.095680718 0.092280686 -0.176525333 0.185144282 0.115784116
sbytes 0.048757831 0.044907203 -0.07860671 0.104355861 0.061818932
dbytes 0.073949495 0.07073006 -0.128000773 0.140550935 0.090410086
rate -0.18776741 0.168431339 -0.25667896 0.257028067 -0.250259704
sttl -0.12149291 0.111207664 -0.180892452 0.173475353 -0.161471934
dttl 0.241772537 0.214230803 -0.328501048 0.331045934 0.322263355
sload -0.130025648 0.119130268 -0.190388137 0.193535459 -0.174953137
dload 0.058215931 0.05468673 -0.092486021 0.097995809 0.076081787
sloss 0.057920965 0.053260196 -0.088886221 0.13589708 0.071644141
dloss 0.081481929 0.07847966 -0.144333769 0.161010325 0.098331803
sinpkt -0.018169 0.015626402 -0.034045938 0.025287213 -0.023316505
dinpkt 0.041195128 0.038584336 -0.070708227 0.092707723 0.054827379
sjit 0.055623151 0.050451569 -0.081847812 0.083059598 0.073129513
djit 0.068081149 0.068293189 -0.113622275 0.118902853 0.090858174
swin 0.269965189 0.241070194 -0.3643555 0.367607174 0.360468887
stcpb 0.230637173 0.206154129 -0.311387749 0.314365753 0.308433324
dtcpb 0.231057451 0.205850281 -0.312207439 0.314568604 0.308076007
dwin 0.277203906 0.247573503 -0.374630352 0.377052807 0.36994129
tcprtt 0.199757556 0.174533831 -0.270697064 0.286146344 0.26590308
synack 0.177062695 0.154497947 -0.245453323 0.268009645 0.234418956
ackdat 0.193011274 0.171012144 -0.266092244 0.273382985 0.258014823
smean 0.04823361 0.042484211 -0.068058027 0.079574215 0.063744348
dmean 0.13739165 0.126189404 -0.207957301 0.218783984 0.178772078
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of each of the 25 component forming variables across 40 samples
The parameters used in constructing Table 3 and Figure 4 are proportional to the coefficients of the linear combination
of the original variables in Table 1. The linear combination makes up PC1 and, in this particular application, they
impinge on the nature of the traffic and so they can be used as predictors of the phenomenon that they symbolise.
The degree of influence of each variable in constructing the components can be deduced from both Tables 2 and 3 as
well as from Figure 4. As implied by Equation 3, randomness manifests in sampling and, hence, in the calculation of
ξτ ∝ pik and it is in this sense that repeated sampling characterises the overall behaviour of cyber-intrusion.
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Figure 4: A graphical illustrations of the malicious flows descriptive statistics in Table 3 from across 40 samples
Both the original full data and repeated samples exhibit a clear pattern of duality. The left hand side panel in Figure 5
shows the densities of the full data and three random samples of sizes 50, 500 and 5000 while the patterns on the right
are proportional to the correlations between the individual variables and the first component across 40 samples.
Figure 5: Component one densities from selected samples and 40 samples variable correlations with the component
The fact that no single variable exhibits significantly high correlation with the component in the right hand side panel of
Figure 5 highlights the potential masking of the flows. However, the fact that together the variables show a consistent
separation of the data into two distinctive regions, with several variables such as dttl, sttl, dload, rate, dloss etc,
standing out, implies that based on patterns and relationships from both the full data and multiple samples drawn from
it–i.e., given xτ as defined in Section 3.1, we can separate k groups with probabilities pik and pik¯ corresponding to
different descriptions of intrusion. More specifically, we can use historical data numerics associated with the first
significant components, say, to train and test models to measuring and monitoring the risk of known types of intrusion.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a data-flow adaptive method for intrusion detection based on repeated sampling from a high-
dimensional cyber-attack data source. We set off to achieve the three objectives in Section 1 from the premises of
9
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
the two well-documented intrusion detection techniques - misuse in [17] and anomaly detection [18]. Our modelling
interpretation of the former is that of rule-based decision that would help identify a suspicious behavior by comparing
it to known catalogued malicious flows. On the other hand, the latter, as in many applications, was perceived as a
model, the departure from which is a cause for alarm. We took a unified approach to the two and in both cases the
binary and multi-class labels in the dataset used in the study provided the basis for such an approach. Comparing the
performance of our method of choice, PCA, with other dimensional reduction techniques would have been ideal, but
for the limitations imposed by the study objectives. However, we were able to demonstrate, via Algorithm 1, how
information resulting from reduced data dimension of a large number of malicious flows, can be utilised to monitor
the emerging structures and potentially be used as inputs in build robust intrusion detection systems. The results were
achieved via repeated sampling, yielding parameters that were generally used to fine-tune potential structures in each
sample. Aggregating the parameters over many runs, we were able to reproduce consistent patterns of the data dual-
ity. The resulting patterns render themselves readily to predictive modelling using the two class labels and therefore
provide scope for extension into identifying new attacks. For that to happen, however, data attributes must always be
added to the training and testing set repositories, not least because of the dynamic nature of intrusion.
Novelty of our approach derives from iterative estimation of the roles played by individual variables in construction
of components, particularly the potential for monitoring future attacks by focusing on the metrics that dominate the
components. Without being influenced by the provided levels of attack types, our findings are particularly intriguing
for two reasons–the duality may mean either masking or swamping of attack types. That is, some currently unknown
attack types may slip through as normal which is why it is imperative to highlight two important aspects of this
study–the mechanics of the algorithm and the data attributes. If we knew the relevant density functions and classes of
attack, we would simply observe data flows and make predictions. But in practice we have to estimate these parameters
from random data and test our algorithms on another random dataset. Our contribution focused on variability as
determined by zi[τ ] and proportions pik. For continuous attributes, these parameters typically derive from the mean
and covariance matrices of the normal mixtures while for categorical data, they are group proportions. Finally, our
choice of the angular order of the eigenvectors was justified by the adopted dimensional-reduction methods used as
it would make multiple comparisons to be made using other eigenvalues. There are other ways of re-ordering the
correlation matrix to help visualisation of the inherent patterns. This random nature of analytical studies stipulates that
research be a function of data sharing, design, experimental setups and research findings. One way of achieving that
goals is to go the way of open source repositories. We expect that this paper will contribute towards that aspiration,
attain data enrichment, methods enhancements and open new paths to future studies.
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